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Motivation 
 Increase in attacks on the authentication of the Remote 
Desktop Protocol – RDP (e. g., the worm Morto [1]) 
 
 Host level detection is not suitable for large networks 
such as the campus network of Masaryk University 
 
 The lack of network-based detection tools 
 
 
Is it possible?  
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Design of the flow-based signature of RDP 
authentication I. 
 Flow-based analysis of: 
 RDP clients for various operating systems,  
 tools for brute-force attacks. 
 
 
 Flow-based signature of authentication: 
 in packets – <20, 100>, 
 in bytes – <2200, 8001>, 
 out packets – <30, 190>, 
 out bytes – <3000, 180000>, 
 TCP flags – ACK, PUSH, RESET, SYN, 
 dst net – <the address of the local network>. 
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Design of the flow-based signature of RDP 
authentication II. 
 Additional conditions to lower false positives: 
 
 attacker used a TCP SYN scan technique, 
 
 time factor of attack, 
 
 at least three authentication attempts per victim, 
 
 at least three victims at the same time. 
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RdpMonitor – NfSen plugin 
 Publicly available brute-force detection plugin for widely 
used NfSen collector [2] 
 The plugin uses the derived NetFlow signature to 
automate the attack detection and reporting 
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Evaluation of the flow-based detection 
signature I. 
 Data acquired in the large campus network of Masaryk 
University from October 1 to November 30, 2012 
 
 The plugin has detected 3,430 attacks originating from 
2,057 unique IP addresses 
 
 Approximately 40 % of all RDP related traffic is 
malicious   
 
 Attackers were blocked for two days 
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Evaluation of the flow-based detection 
signature II. 
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Conclusions 
 We have analyzed network flows acquired during RDP 
authentication of various clients and proposed the 
general signature for detection of RDP brute-force 
attacks. 
 
 The detection method was successfully implemented as 
a publicly available plugin for the NfSen collector. 
 
 Thousands of attacks with almost zero false positive 
rate have been mitigated and reported. 
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Future work 
 Analyze the impact of various values of thresholds of 
additional conditions to false positive/negative rate 
 
 Analyze the impact of changes in duration of blocking 
to attackers’ behavior 
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